Georgia - Russia (A Beginning v. 2.0)

Ok, so I never really got started when I set this up. Let's see if we can do better this time around.

As we're back in Richmond housesitting, I've actually been reading the paper in the morning (or early afternoon - my internal clock is admittedly a little screwed up at the moment), and so I've devoted some thought to the Georgia-Russia conflict over South Ossetia. First of all, Georgia has acted colossally stupid in all of this. For the great majority of Georgia's independence from Russia, it has not controlled South Ossetia, which essentially seceded successfully and has been under Russian protection. The attempt to recover the province reeks of nationalistic pride; from what I understand, it is a poor area that is unlikely to provide much benefit to Georgia even if they were able to recover it. The people of South Ossetia do not wish to be part of Georgia and were likely to cause trouble in the event that they were reconquered. Russia was certainly going to provide significant military opposition, and Iraq and Afghanistan have both shown what happens when a major power with relatively high-tech weaponry opposes a minor power. The cost-benefit analysis of this scenario is not particularly difficult.

The Georgian president has spouted the usual rhetoric about how this is an important test of the western world/US and that it has so far failed to live up to its ideology, etc. The simple fact is that there is little that the US et al. could do. Military assistance is an impossibility - besides the risks of World War III, it would be political suicide to open another military front with Iraq so unpopular. Trade embargos (always unpopular with the countries that do the most trade, especially when the embargoed country is as major a market as Russia) would take time to agree upon, then to set up, and even then to have an effect. As a result, we get exactly what should be expected - repeated firm calls for a cease-fire and international mediation.

Russia, I believe, is on the point of acting foolishly itself. They have demonstrated their military dominance and achieved the primary objective of protecting South Ossetia. They are in a position, in talks, to demand that Georgia permanently relinquish its claims to both South Ossetia and the other secessionist province (something with an A I'm too lazy to look up right now). Their initial actions opposing Georgia's attempt were defensible, given their history in the region and the longstanding preference of South Ossetia for independence or even Russian rule. However, if they do not agree to a cease-fire fairly soon, they risk a significant alienation of the western world, possibly worse than that of the US following the beginning of the Iraq war. The harm to diplomatic and trade relations Russia could suffer might easily outweigh the advantages of toppling the pro-US Georgian government or even annexing Georgia.

A final note - let us assume that Russia does agree to a cease-fire, withdraws its forces into South Ossetia, and that the result of mediation is South Ossetian independence. I would not go so far as to say that democray and the free market are in trouble in Georgia, but the current government is likely to be voted out in disgrace for their miscalculations. Anti-Russian sentiment is likely to continue to be strong (every day Russia waits before agreeing to a cease-fire will only make them more hated in Georgia); on the other hand, the lack of tangible US support (even if it was foolish to expect it) will do significant damage to the Georgian-US alliance. In other words, Russia is nearly as likely to topple a pro-US Georgian government by agreeing to a cease-fire as by continuing to fight.